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THE NEW MEXICO PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION'
ROBERT J. DESIDERIO,t HUGH J. AULT,tt
JAMES W. SMITHttt
The legal notices in any newspaper indicate that many profes-
sional groups are now incorporating their practices. In New Mexico,
these professional corporations are the result of two developments:
( 1 ) United States v. Empey2 and related cases,3 in which it has been
held that professional corporations can be classified as corporations
for federal income tax purposes, and (2) the New Mexico Profes-
sional Corporation Act, as amended by Chapter 245 of the Laws of
1969, 4 through which the New Mexico Legislature has expressed its
agreement with the policy of allowing professionals to incorporate.
This article will present the events which have led to the present
interests, analyze the New Mexico Professional Corporation Act and
relate it with the federal income tax laws, and discuss some of the tax
traps awaiting the unplanned professional corporation.
I
TAX BACKGROUND
The lawyers in Empey and the doctors in O'Neil and Kurzner were
probably prompted by tax considerations to abandon the traditional
t Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law.
tt Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School.
ttt Professor, Boston College Law School.
1. Portions of this article first appeared in the Massachusetts Law Quarterly. Smith
& Ault, The Corporate Prof essional-United States v. Empey, 54 Mass. L.Q. 14 (1969).
The present article has been adapted in part from that article to fit the situation in
New Mexico. Ideas have been borrowed from that article and sections republished
with the permission of the Massachusetts Bar Association.
2. 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969), aff'g 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
3. Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'g 286 F. Supp. 839
(S.D. Fla. 1968) ; O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969), aff'g 281 F.
Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968) ; Cochran v. United States 299 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Ariz.
1969) ; First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 69-903
(No. 68-C-28) (N.D. Okla., March 4, 1969) ; Smith v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1016
(S.D. Fla. 1969) ; Williams v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1969) ; Holder
v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (D. Ga. 1968) ; Wallace v. United States, 294 F. Supp.
1225 (D. Ark. 1968). These cases and Empey deal with a common issue: whether a
professional group incorporated under state law is to be classified as a corporation for
federal income tax purposes. As a group all nine cases will be referred to throughout
this article as "the Empey cases." It must be noted at this time that the government has
conceded that professional corporations "will generally be treated as corporations for
tax purposes." IRS Technical Information Release No. 1019 (August 8, 1969).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-22-1 (Supp. 1969).
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partnership form of legal organization for the corporate form.
Although there is language in the Empey case indicating that pro-
fessionals are incorporating for nontax, business purposes," certainly
the federal income tax advantages available to corporations are a
most important, if not the principal factor. The primary tax benefit
to professionals who are able to incorporate is the ability to establish
qualified pension and profit-sharing plans under Section 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code. These plans have the advantages of tax de-
ferral, tax-free buildup on the earnings of the contributions to the
plans, and capital gains treatment on certain distributions. 6 For ex-
ample, in Empey, the corporation had established a qualified profit-
sharing plan and made yearly contributions to the plan. The plaintiff
in the case, Mr. Empey, was an attorney holding ten per cent of the
stock of the corporation. He reported on his 1965 tax return ten
percent of the profits of the corporation for the period he was a share-
holder. He then sued in the district court for a refund of the difference
between the actual salary paid to him for that period and the ten per
cent share of the profits on which he would have been taxed were he a
ten per cent partner. The difference was presumably the amount con-
tributed on his behalf to the corporation's profit-sharing plan.
In addition to pension and profit-sharing plans, the corporate form
enables the professional to accumulate some income at the 22 per cent
presurtax rates rather than at the top individual bracket, subject of
course to the restrictions on accumulation of earnings.7 Other benefits
available to professionals operating in the corporate form are the
five thousand dollar death benefit exclusion,8 estate and gift tax ex-
emptions for employer contributions, 9 the exclusion available for sick
5. For example, see the finding of the District Court in the O'Neil case that a group
of doctors changed from a partnership to a corporation for "the non-tax 'business pur-
pose' of controlling a sizeable and unwieldy organization . . ." 281 F. Supp. at 361.
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 402-404. Under the Self-Employed Individual Retire-
ment Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-04 (1963) (the "Keogh Plan") professionals, as self-em-
ployed individuals, can enjoy certain tax-saving benefits by setting up certain retire-
ment programs. However, under the Keogh Plan the non-incorporated professional as a
self-employed individual can only contribute a certain dollar amount to a plan tax
free. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404(e). Such limitations do not exist with respect to
plans established for an "employee" (the professional) by an "employer" (the pro-
fessional corporation). For a more complete discussion of the point see Snyder &
Herkstein, Quasi-Corporations, Quasi-Employer and Quasi-Tax Relief for Professional
Persons, 48 Cornell L.Q. 613 (1963).
Under the Tax Reform Bill of 1969 as passed by the House of Representatives
(H.R. 13270 91st Cong. 1st Sess. (1969)), profit sharing benefits of sections 401-404
would be eliminated.
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 11, 531. The ultimate distribution of the income would
of course be subject to tax, either as a dividend or as a capital gain on distribution.
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101 (b).
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2039(c), 2517.
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pay and wage continuation plans, 10 group insurance," and the gen-
eral availability of deferred compensation arrangements postponing
the receipt of income until the taxpayer is in a reduced bracket. The
sine qua non for all these tax advantages is the existence of an organi-
zation recognized as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.
The taxpayer success in establishing corporate status in the Empey
cases and the government's recent concession that professional cor-
porations "will generally be treated as corporations for tax pur-
poses,' 2 is the most recent chapter in a long dispute between the tax-
payers and the government over professional associations. As will
be indicated later, the government's concession in T.I.R. 1019
probably means that a professional group incorporated under state
law will be classified as a corporation for tax purposes. Thus, the
discussion which follows is intended more as a presentation of the
background of the present status of professional corporations than
an argument for the corporate treatment of professional groups. It
was felt that some understanding of the background would give
perspective to the New Mexico Professional Corporation Act.
The long-standing dispute over the status of professional organi-
zations turns on the interpretation of Section 7701 (a) (2) and (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 7701 (a) (2) provides that
"[t]he term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or other unincorporated organization . . . which is not
within the meaning of this title, . . . a corporation. Section 7701
(a) (3) states that "[t]he term 'corporation' includes associations,
joint stock companies and insurance companies." The current prob-
lem, which only appears simple, involves the classification of a pro-
fessional organization within one of these two circular definitions.13
To give the present controversy some meaning examine the de-
velopments that led to it,'4 beginning with Morrissey v. Commis-
sioner.15 In Morrissey, the beneficiaries of a business trust transferred
real estate to the trust for the purpose of conducting and operating
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 104-, 105.
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 79.
12. IRS Technical Information Release No. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969).
13. There have been a number of articles on the problems of professional corpora-
tions. The material is collected in Bittker, Professional Service Organizations: A Criti-
que of the Literature, 23 Tax L. Rev. 429 (1969). For an excellent presentation of the
history see also Eaton, Professional Corporations and Associations in Perspective, 23
Tax L. Rev. 1 (1967) ; Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations
and Corporations, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 603 (1965) ; Bittker, Professional Associations and
Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1961) ;
Note, The Taxation of Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
776 (1963).
14. For a complete history of the controversy, see Scallen, supra note 13.
15. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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golf courses, club houses and related activities for a profit. In return,
the beneficiaries took "transferable certificates for shares which were
divided into 2000 preferred shares of the par value of $100 each,
and 2000 common shares of no par value. . . ."'I Management of
the trust was vested in the trustees, who "were declared to be without
power to bind the beneficiaries personally by 'any act, neglect or de-
fault,' and the beneficiaries and all persons dealing with the trustees
were required to look for payment or indemnity to the trust prop-
erty.' 1 7 Neither the death of the beneficiary nor the death of the
trustee was to end the trust.'8 For the taxable years in question, 1923
to 1926, the number of beneficiaries ranged from 920 persons in
1923 to 275 in 1926. l1 The trustees contended that the business trust
should be taxed as a trust, while the Commissioner argued that it was
an association under the predecessor of section 7701 (a) (3) of the
Internal Revenue Code and should be taxed as a corporation. In
holding for the Commissioner, the Supreme Court set out the now
famous test of corporate resemblance: "The inclusion of associations
with corporations implies resemblance; but it is resemblance and not
identity. The resemblance points to features distinguishing associa-
tions from partnerships as well as from ordinary trusts. ' 20 The Court
in its analysis found the following features characteristic of corpo-
rate organization : ( 1 ) the corporation as an entity holds title to the
property; (2) the corporate organization involves centralized man-
agement through representatives; (3) the enterprise is not termi-
nated by the death of the owners of the beneficial interests; (4) the
beneficial interests in the enterprise may be transferred without affect-
ing the continuity of the enterprise; and (5) the participants' liability
in the venture is limited to the property involved1.2 Applying these
criteria to the facts of the case, the Court found that the trust resem-
bled a corporation more than a trust and thus constituted an "asso-
ciation" as the term is used in the statutory definition of corpora-
tion.22
After the Commissioner's successful assertion of corporate status
in Morrissey,23 rising individual tax rates and the possibilities of mak-
16. Id. at 347.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 348.
20. Id. at 357.
21. Id. at 357-58.
22. Id. at 359-62. The Court found that the trust resembled a corporation on all
five counts. The first characteristic mentioned by the Court, the holding of title to prop-
erty as an entity, has not been of great significance in the subsequent cases and regula-
tions. Accordingly mention hereafter of "Morrissey-type" characteristics will refer to
the last four characteristics: centralized management, continuity of life, transferability
of interests and limited liability.
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ing use of pension and profit-sharing plans to defer and reduce the
tax burden led to attempts by professionals to tailor their forms of
organization to meet the corporate resemblance test set out in Mor-
rissey. These attempts finally received judicial examination in United
States v. Kintner.24 In Kintner the taxpayer and the doctors with
whom he was associated in a medical partnership dissolved the part-
nership and formed an unincorporated association for the practice of
medicine. The articles of the association attempted to give the organi-
zation the "attributes of a corporation" as defined in Morrissey.25
Applying the Morrissey test, the district court found the association
was an "association" and not a partnership and thus taxable as a cor-
poration.26 This holding was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. After the decision in Kintner, the Revenue Service indicated
that it would not follow the Kintner result.2 7 In November 1960, the
Service issued the so-called Kintner regulations, effective in 1961,
giving its interpretation of the test of "corporateness" as set out in
Morrissey.28 Because of the importance they place on state law, these
regulations make it extremely difficult, to put it mildly, for profes-
sional groups like the medical organization in Kintner to be classified
as a corporation.
The regulations under the 1939 Code were rather emphatic about
the impact of state law: "For the purpose of taxation the Internal
Revenue Code makes its own classification and prescribes its own
standards of classification. Local law is of no importance in this con-
nection. ' 29 On the other hand, the Kintner regulations promulgated
23. The Commissioner was also successful in Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473
(7th Cir. 1936), in which a medical practice organized as a trust was held to be an
association for tax purposes.
24-. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
25. "The Association was to terminate upon the death of the last survivor of the
original members. . . . [OInly physicians or surgeons duly licensed to practice medi-
cine in Montana were eligible for admission to membership. The business of the As-
sociation was to be managed by an Executive Committee composed of five of the
members. . . . Any indebtedness incurred by the Association through the act of a
member without authority conferred by the Committee was chargeable against such
member's share of the earnings of the Association. Only the members were to be liable
to third parties for professional misconduct." The court also found that the association
had operated according to its Articles. Id. at 420.
26. 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952).
27. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 598; cf. Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. Bull.
886.
28. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 409 (amended
by T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 553). Before the regulations had been issued a district
court in Texas also decided that a medical group was an "association" within the
meaning of section 7701(a) (3). Gait v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex.
1959). See also Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
29. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-1 (1953):
For the purpose of taxation the Internal Revenue Code makes its own classifi-
cation and prescribes its own standards of classification. Local law is of no
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under the 1954 Code, 30 while stating that "the classes into which
organizations are to be placed for purposes of taxation are deter-
mined under the Internal Revenue Code," and that it is the Internal
Revenue Code which establishes the standards to be applied in clas-
sifying each organization, provide that "local law governs in deter-
mining whether the legal relationships which have been established
in the formation of an organization are such that the standards are
met."3'
In establishing the standards to be employed in determining
whether an unincorporated organization is an "association" within
the meaning of Section 7701 (a) (3), the regulations rely upon Mor-
rissey:
(a) Characterstics of corporations. (1) The term "association"
refers to an organization whose characteristics require it to be classified
for purposes of taxation as a corporation rather than as another type
of organization such as a partnership or a trust. There are a number
of major characteristics found in a pure corporation which, taken to-
gether, distinguish it from other organizations. These are: (i) associ-
ates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains there-
from, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v)
liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi)
free transferability of interests. Whether a particular organization is
to be classified as an association must be determined by taking into
account the presence or absence of each of these corporate characteris-
tics. The presence or absence of these characteristics will depend upon
the facts in each individual case. In addition to the major characteris-
tics set forth in this subparagraph, other factors may be found in some
cases which may be significant in classifying an organization as an as-
sociation, a partnership, or a trust. An organization will be treated
as an association if the corporate characteristics are such that the or-
importance in this connection. Thus, a trust may be classed as a trust or as
an association (and, therefore, as a corporation), depending upon its nature
or its activities. See § 39.3797-3. The term "partnership" is not limited to the
common law meaning of partnership, but is broader in its scope and includes
groups not commonly called partnerships. See § 39.3797-4. The term 'corpora-
tion' is not limited to the artificial entity usually known as a corporation, but
includes also an association, a trust classed as an association because of its
nature or its activities, a joint-stock company, an insurance company, and cer-
tain kinds of partnerships. See §§ 39.3797-2 and 393797-4. See section 191 and
the regulations thereunder, for recognition as a partner of any person who
owns a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a material income-
producing factor, whether or not such interest was derived by purchase or gift
from any other person. The definitions, terms, and classifications, as set forth
in section 3797, shall have the same respective meaning and scope in the
regulations in this part.
30. The Kintner regulations were the first regulations promulgated under Section
7701 of the 1954 Code.
31. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (c) (1960), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 553.
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ganization more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership or
trust. See Morrissey et al. v. Commissioner (1935) 296 U.S. 344.82
In employing the Morrissey standards, however, the regulations
adopt a rule different from that used by the Court. First, the regula-
tions provide that in classifying an unincorporated organization,
neither characteristics common to both a trust and a corporation, nor
characteristics common to both a partnership and a corporation are
to be considered.3 3 The best example of this is found in the regula-
tions themselves:
For example, since centralization of management, continuity of life,
free transferability of interests, and limited liability are generally com-
mon to trusts and corporations, the determination of whether a trust
which has such characteristics is to be treated for tax purposes as a
trust or as an association depends on whether there are associates
and an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom.
On the other hand, since associates and an objective to carry on bus-
iness and divide the gains therefrom are generally common to both
corporations and partnerships, the determination of whether an organi-
zation which has such characteristics is to be treated for tax purposes
as a partnership or as an association depends on whether there exists
centralization of management, continuity of life, free transferability
of interests, and limited liability.3 4
Next, the regulations add that the unincorporated organization will
not be classified as an association unless it has more "uncommon"
corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics.3" What
this means is that the organization must have a majority of the
"uncommon" corporate characteristics. Thus, an unincorporated
organization will be treated as an association rather than a partner-
ship if it has any three of the four common characteristics: con-
tinuity of life, centralization of management, limited liability and
free transferability of interests. An organization with only two of
the characteristics does not resemble a corporation. Since the cur-
rent hassle is based upon a partnership-corporation classification the
remainder of the discussion will be directed to issues concerning such
classification.
The above method of classifying necessitates administrative defi-
nitions of "continuity of life," "centralization of management,"
"limited liability," and "free transferability." It is from these defi-
nitions that the actual weight which state law has in the classifica-
tion of an unincorporated organization is felt.
32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960).
33. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1960).
34. Id.
35. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1960).
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At first blush, the regulations give the four attributes their com-
mon meanings.8 6 However, a second look indicates that whether
each attribute is possessed by the organization depends upon a strict
interpretation of local law, and not upon what might be the case in
fact arising from contract or other means. Thus, although the mem-
bers of the organization might agree, formally or otherwise, that
the business will continue for a stated period even if a member
should die, retire, resign, be expelled, become insane or bankrupt,
the organization does not have continuity of life if under local law
the "entity" is dissolved-albeit the enterprise continues-at the
36. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b)-(d) provides:
(b) Continuity of life. (1) An organization has continuity of life if the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any mem-
ber will not cause a dissolution of the organization. On the other hand, if the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any mem-
ber will cause a dissolution of the organization, continuity of life does not exist.
If the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner of a limited partner-
ship causes a dissolution of the partnership, unless the remaining general part-
ners agree to continue the partnership or unless all remaining members agree
to continue the partnership, continuity of life does not exist. See Glensder Tex-
tile Company (1942) 46 B.T.A. 176 (A., C.B. 1942-1, 8).
(2) For purposes of this paragraph, dissolution of an organization means
an alteration of the identity of an organization by reason of a change in the
relationship between its members as determined under local law. For example,
since the resignation of a partner from a general partnership destroys the
mutual agency which exists between such partner and his copartners and
thereby alters the personal relation between the partners which constitutes the
identity of the partnership itself, the resignation of a partner dissolves the
partnership. A corporation, however, has a continuing identity which is de-
tached from the relationship between its stockholders. The death, insanity,
or bankruptcy of a shareholder or the sale of a shareholder's interest has no
effect upon the identity of the corporation and, therefore, does not work a
dissolution of the organization. An agreement by which an organization is es-
tablished may provide that the business will be continued by the remaining
members in the event of the death or withdrawal of any member, but such
agreement does not establish continuity of life if under local law" the death
or withdrawal of any member causes a dissolution of the organization. Thus,
there may be a dissolution of the organization and no continuity of life al-
though the business is continued by the remaining members.
(3) An agreement establishing an organization may provide that the or-
ganization is to continue for a stated period or until the completion of a stated
undertaking or such agreement may provide for the termination of the organi-
zation at will or otherwise. In determining whether any member has the
power of dissolution, it will be necessary to examine the agreement and to
ascertain the effect of such agreement under local law. For example, if the
agreement expressly provides that the organization can be terminated by the
will of any member, it is clear that the organization lacks continuity of life.
However, if the agreement provides that the organization is to continue for a
stated period or until the completion of a stated transaction, the organization
has continuity of life if the effect of the agreement is that no member has the
power to dissolve the organization in contravention of the agreement. Never-
theless, if, notwithstanding such agreement, any member has the power under
local law to dissolve the organization, the organization lacks continuity of life.
[VOL. 9
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happening of one of those events. Although the articles of associa-
tion or an agreement provide that the organization will be managed
by a board of less than all the associates, the organization lacks
centralization of management if under local law a mutual agency
relationship exists among the associates. Although the members of
the organization do in fact limit their liability by agreement, the
organization lacks limited liability if under local law each member
theoretically remains liable to creditors regardless of the agree-
ment. And, although a member by agreement can transfer all his
rights in the organization, the organization does not have the
attribute of free transferability of interest if under local law any
Accordingly, a general partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the
Uniform Partnership Act and a limited partnership subject to a statute cor-
responding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act both lack continuity of life.
(c) Centralization of management. (1) An organization has centralized
management if any person (or any group of persons which does not include
all the members) has continuing exclusive authority to make the management
decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for which the organization
was formed. Thus, the persons who are vested with such management authority
resemble in powers and functions the directors of a statutory corporation. The
effective operation of a business organization composed of many members gen-
erally depends upon the centralization in the hands of a few of exclusive au-
thority to make management decisions for the organization, and therefore, cen-
tralized management is more likely to be found in such an organization than
in a smaller organization.
(2) The persons who have such authority may, or may not, be members of
the organization and may hold office as a result of a selection by the members
from time to time, or may- be self-perpetuating in office. See Morrissey et al.
v. Commissioner (1935) 296 U.S. 344. Centralized management can be accom-
plished by election to office, by proxy appointment, or by any other means
which has the effect of concentrating in a management group continuing ex-
clusive authority to make management decisions.
(3) Centralized management means a concentration of continuing exclusive
authority to make independent business decisions on behalf of the organization
which do not require ratification by members of such organization. Thus, there
is not centralized management when the centralized authority is merely to
perform ministerial acts as an agent at the direction of a principal.
(4) There is no centralization of continuing exclusive authority to make
management decisions, unless the managers have sole authority to make such
decisions. For example, in the case of a corporation or a trust, the concentra-
tion of management powers in a board of directors or trustees effectively pre-
vents a stockholder or a trust beneficiary, simply because he is a stockholder
or beneficiary, from binding the corporation or the trust by his acts. How-
ever, because of the mutual agency relationship between members of a gen-
eral partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, such a general partnership cannot achieve effective concentration
of management powers and, therefore, centralized management. Usually, the
act of any partner within the scope of the partnership business binds all the
partners; and even if the partners agree among themselves that the powers
of management shall be exclusively in a selected few, this agreement will be
ineffective as against an outsider who had no notice of it. In addition, limited
partnerships subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act, generally do not have centralized management, but centralized
OCTOBER 19691
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transfer which extends beyond an assignment of profit sharing rights
is a dissolution of the organization and a formation of a new
organization. In other words, any organization which under local
law would be governed by the Uniform Partnership Act, the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act or similar law, cannot be classified
as an association. Since an unincorporated professional organization
is usually deemed a partnership under the law of most states, such
organization cannot fall within the administrative definition of an
association and therefore cannot be classified as a corporation for
tax purposes.
This had been subtly brought out in Example ( 1 ) of the Kintner
regulations :a7
management ordinarily does exist in such a limited partnership if substantially
all the interests in the partnership are owned by the limited partners.
(d) Limited liability. (1) An organization has the corporate characteristic
of limited liability if under local law there is no member who is personally
liable for the debts of or claims against the organization. Personal liability
means that a creditor of an organization may seek personal satisfaction from
a member of the organization to the extent that the assets of such organization
are insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim. A member of the organization
who is personally liable for the obligations of the organization may make an
agreement under which another person, whether or not a member of the organi-
zation, assumes such liability or agrees to indemnify such member for any such
liability. However, if under local law the member remains liable to such cred-
itors notwithstanding such agreement, there exists personal liability with respect
to such member. In the case of a general partnership subject to a statute cor-
responding to the Uniform Partnership Act, personal liability exists with re-
spect to each general partner. Similarly, in the case of a limited partnership
subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
personal liability exists with respect to each general partner, except as pro-
vided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph.
(2) In the case of an organization formed as a limited partnership, per-
sonal liability does not exist, for purposes of this paragraph, with respect to a
general partner when he has no substantial assets (other than his interest in
the partnership) which could be reached by a creditor of the organization
and when he is merely a "dummy" acting as the agent of the limited partners.
Notwithstanding the formation of the organization as a limited partnership,
when the limited partners act as the principals of such general partner, per-
sonal liability will exist with respect to such limited partners. Also, if a cor-
poration is a general partner, personal liability exists with respect to such gen-
eral partner when the corporation has substantial assets (other than its inter-
est in the partnership) which could be reached by a creditor of the limited
partnership. A general partner may contribute his services, but no capital, to
the organization, but if such general partner has substantial assets (other than
his interest in the partnership), there exists personal liability. Furthermore, if
the organization is engaged in financial transactions which involve large sums
of money, and if the general partners have substantial assets (other than their
interests in the partnership), there exists personal liability although the assets
of such general partners would be insufficient to satisfy any substantial por-
tion of the obligations of the organization. In addition, although the general
partner has no substantial assets (other than his interest in the partnership),
personal liability exists with respect to such general partner when he is not
merely a "dummy" acting as the agent of the limited partners.
[VOL. 9
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A group of seven doctors forms a clinic for the purpose of furnish-
ing, for profit, medical and surgical services to the public. They each
transfer assets to the clinic, and their agreement provides that except
upon complete liquidation of the organization on the vote of three-
fourths of its members, no member has any individual interest in its
assets. Their agreement also provides that neither the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, nor expulsion of a member shall
cause the dissolution of the organization. Under the applicable local
law, on the occurrence of such an event, no member has the power to
dissolve the organization. The management of the clinic is vested
exclusively in an executive committee of four members elected by all
the members, and under the applicable local law, no one acting with-
out the authority of this committee has the power to bind the organi-
zation by his acts. Members of the clinic are personally liable for all
debts of, or claims against, the clinic. Every member has the right
to transfer his interest to a doctor who is not a member of the organi-
zation, but he must first advise the organization of the proposed
transfer and give it the opportunity on a vote of the majoity to
purchase the interest at its fair market value. The organization has
associates and an objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom. While it does not have the corporate characteristic of
limited liability, it does have the characteristics of centralized
management, continuity of life, and a modified form of free transfer-
ability of interests. The organization will be classified as an associa-
tion for all the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. [Emphasis
added].
Very few organizations could have come within this example. Most
unincorporated professional organizations, on the other hand,
would fall within Examples (2) "1 and (3) :39
Example (2). A group of seven doctors forms a clinic for the pur-
pose of furnishing, for profit, medical and surgical services to the
public. They each transfer assets to the clinic, and their agreement
provides that except upon complete liquidation of the organization on
the vote of three-fourths of its members, no member has any individ-
ual interest in its assets. Their agreement also provides that neither
the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, nor expulsion
of a member shall cause the dissolution of the organization. How-
ever, under the applicable local law, a member who withdraws does
have the power to dissolve the organization. While the agreement
provides that the management of the clinic is to be vested exclusively
in an executive committee of four members elected by all the mem-
bers, this provision is ineffective as against outsiders who had no
37. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g), T.D. 6502, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 409. Example 1,
deleted by T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 553.
38. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (1960). Example 2.
39. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (1960). Example 3.
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notice of it; and, therefore, the act of any member within the scope
of the organization's business binds the organization insofar as such
outsiders are concerned. While the agreement declares that each indi-
vidual doctor alone is liable for acts of malpractice, members of the
clinic are, nevertheless, personally liable for all debts of the clinic in-
cluding claims based on malpractice. No member has the right, with-
out the consent of all the other members, to transfer his interest to
a doctor who is not a member of the clinic. The organization has
associates and an objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom. However, it does not have the corporate characteristics of
continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free
transferability of interests. The organization will be classified as a
partnership for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.
Example (3). A group of twenty-five lawyers forms an organiza-
tion for the purpose of furnishing, for profit, legal services to the
public. Their agreement provides that the organization will dissolve
upon the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, or expulsion of a
member. While their agreement provides that the management of the
organization is to be vested exclusively in an executive committee of
five members elected by all the members, this provision is ineffective
as against outsiders who had no notice of it; and, therefore, the act
of any member within the scope of the organization's business binds
the organization insofar as such outsiders are concerned. Members of
the organization are personally liable for all debts, or claims against,
the organization. No member has the right, without the consent of
all the other members, to transfer his interest to a lawyer who is not
a member of the organization. The organization has associates and an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom. How-
ever, the four corporate characteristics of limited liability, central-
ized management, free transferability of interests, and continuity of
life are absent in this case. The organization will be classified as a
partnership for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.
Since the difficulties of qualifying under the Kintner regulations
resulted from the application of certain provisions of state law,
many state legislatures, at the urging of professionals who desired
to incorporate for federal income tax reasons changed their state
laws applicable to professional organizations. Beginning in 1961,
there appeared a variety of both professional corporation and pro-
fessional association statutes designed to allow professionals to
comply with the Kintner regulations. The New Mexico Professional
Corporation Act, enacted in 1963, is typical of this type of legisla-
tive response.
Faced with an ever-increasing number of state corporation stat-
utes, the Treasury Department in 1965 promulgated new regula-
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tions dealing specifically with professional corporations. 40 The
1965 amendments take the position that the relations between a
professional and his clients or patients are "inherently different"
from the relations characteristic of an ordinary business corporation
and in practice make it nearly impossible for a group of profes-
sionals to qualify as a professional corporation. 4' The 1965 regula-
tions made three changes to the Kintner regulations to bring about
this result. First, the following two sentences were added to section
301.7701-1 (c), which deals with the effect of local law :42
Nevertheless, the labels applied by local law to organizations,
which may now or hereafter be authorized by local law, are in and
of themselves of no importance in the classification of such organiza-
tions for the purpose of taxation under the Internal Revenue Code.
Thus, a professional service organization, formed under the law of a
state authorizing the formation by one or more persons of a so-called
professional service corporation, would not be classified for purposes
of taxation as a "corporation" merely because the organization was
so labeled under local law.43
40. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 553.
41. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1) (ii), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 553.
42. See text accompanying note 31, supra.
43. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 553 presently reads:
(c) Effect of local law. As indicated in paragraph (b) of this section, the
classes into which organizations are to be placed for purposes of taxation are
determined under the Internal Revenue Code, Thus, a particular organization
might be classified as a trust under the law of one State and a corporation un-
der the law of another State. However, for purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code, this organization would be uniformly classed as a trust, an association
(and, therefore, taxable as a corporation), or some other entity, depending
upon its nature under the classification standards of the Internal Revenue Code.
Similarly, the term "partnership" is not limited to the common-law meaning of
partnership, but is broader in its scope and includes groups not commonly
called partnerships. See § 1.761-1 of this chapter (Income Tax Regulations)
and § 301.7701-3. The term "corporation" is not limited to the artificial entity
usually known as a corporation, but includes also an association, a trust classed
as an association because of its nature or its activities, a joint-stock company,
and an insurance company. Although it is the Internal Revenue Code rather
than local law which establishes the tests or standards which will be applied
in determining the classification in which an organization belongs, local law
governs in determining whether the legal relationships which have been es-
tablished in the formation of an organization are such that the standards are
met. Thus, it is local law which must be applied in determining such matters
as the legal relationships of the members of the organization among them-
selves and with the public at large, and the interests of the members of the
organization in its assets. Nevertheless, the labels applied by local law to
organizations, which may now or hereafter be authorized by local law, are in
and of themselves of no importance in the classification of such organizations
for the purposes of taxation under the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, a profes-
sional service organization, formed under the law of a State authorizing the
formation by one or more persons of a so-called profesional service corpora-
OCTOBER 1969]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
For the first time, the Service questioned the taxable classification
of an incorporated association. Prior to this regulation the contro-
versy had concerned "unincorporated" organizations claiming to be
"associations" under Section 7701 (3). Secondly, the 1965 amend-
ments deleted Example (1) of the Kintner regulations; the ex-
ample that illustrated how an organization which had been given,
by state law, three of the four corporate attributes constituted an
association for tax purposes.44 Finally, the 1965 amendments added
a new subsection (h) to the Kintner regulations which deals speci-
fically with the "classification of professional service organiza-
tions. 45 While indicating that the general rule of corporate re-
tion, would not be classified for purposes of taxation as a "corporation" merely
because the organization was so labeled under local law. See Morrissey et al.
v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). The classification in which a profes-
sional service organization belongs is determined under the tests and stan-
dards set forth in §§ 301.7701-2, 301,7701-3, and 301.7701-4.
44. See text accompanying note 37, supra.
45". Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 553:
Classification of professional service organizations. (1) (i) A professional
service organization is treated as a corporation (or as an association and,
therefore, taxable as a corporation) only if it has sufficient corporate charac-
teristics to be classifiable as a corporation under paraagraph (a) of this sec-
tion, rather than as a partnership or proprietorship. For purposes of determin-
ing the classification of an organization under these regulations, the term 'pro-
fessional service organization,' as used in this paragraph, means an organi-
zation formed by one or more persons to engage in a business involving the
performance of professional services for profit which under local law, may
not be organized and operated in the form of an ordinary business corporation
having the usual characteristics of such a corporation. Thus, even if a pro-
fessional service organization is organized as an ordinary business corpora-
tion, this paragraph applies if such corporation is subject to local regulatory
rules which deprive such corporation of the usual characteristics of an ordi-
nary business corporation. This paragraph applies irrespective of whether an
organization is labeled under local law as a professional service corporation,
a professional service association, a trust, or otherwise.
(ii) In determining whether a professional service organization has the
major characteristics ordinarily found in a business corporation and whether
any other significant factors are to be taken into account in classifying the or-
ganization, the special professional requirements of the profession engaged in
by the members of the organization must be taken into consideration. Al-
though such an organization may have associates and is engaged in business
for profit, the relationships of the members of such an organization to each
other as well as their relationships to employees, to clients, patients, or custom-
ers and to the public are inherently different from the relationships character-
istic of an ordinary business corporation. In determining the nature of these
relationships, consideration must be given to the law under which the
organization is formed, the character, articles of association, by-laws, or
other documents relating to the formation of the organization, and all other
facts and roles governing or pertaining to such relationships in the usual
course of the practice of the profession of the participants.
(2) A professional service organization does not have continuity of life
within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, expulsion, professional disqualification, or
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semblance set out in the Kintner regulations would control the
election to inconsistent public office of any member will (determined without
regard to any agreement among the members) cause under local law the dis-
solution of the organization. A business corporation has a continuing identity
as an entity which is not dependent upon a shareholder's active participation
in any capacity in the production of the income of the corporation. Further-
more, the interest of a shareholder in an ordinary business corporation in-
cludes a right to share in the profits of the corporation, and such right is not
legally dependent (determined without regard to any agreement among the
shareholders) upon his participation in the production of the corporation's
income. However, the interest of a member of a professional service organi-
zation generally is inextricably bound to the establishment and continuance of
an employment relationship with the organization, and he cannot share in the
profits of a professional service organization unless he also shares in the
performance of the services rendered by the organization. For purposes of
this paragraph, the term 'employment relationship' is used to describe such
active participation by the member and is not restricted to the common-law
meaning of such term. If local law, applicable regulations, or professional
ethics do not permit a member of a professional service organization to share
in its profits unless an employment relationship exists between him and the
organization, and if in such case, he or his estate is required to dispose of his
interest in the organization if the employment relationship terminates, the
continuing existence of the organization depends upon the willingness of its re-
maining members, if any, either to agree, by prior arrangement or at the
time of such termination, to acquire his interest or to employ his proposed
successor. The continued existence of such a professional service organization
is similar to that of a partnership formed under the Uniform Partnership Act,
whose business continues pursuant to an agreement providing that the business
will be continued by the remaining members after the withdrawal or death of
a partner (see paragraph (b) of this section), and is essentially different from
the continuity of life possessed by an ordinary business corporation. Conse-
quently, such a professional service organization lacks continuity of life.
(3) In applying the rules of paragraph (c) of this section, relating to cen-
tralization of management, a professional service organization does not have
centralization of management where the managers of a professional service
organization under local law are not vested with the continuing exclusive au-
thority to determine any one or more of the following matters: (i) The hiring
and firing of professional members of the organization and its professional
and lay employees, (ii) The compensation of the members and of such em-
ployees, (iii) the conditions of employment-such as working hours, vacation
periods, and sick leave, (iv) the persons who will be accepted as clients or
patients, (v) who will handle each individual case or matter, (vi) the pro-
fessional policies and procedures to be followed in handling each individual
case, (vii) the fees to be charged by the organization, (viii) the nature of
the records to be kept, their use, and their disposition, and (ix) the times
and amounts of distributions of the earnings of the organization to its mem-
bers as such. Moreover, although a measure of central control may exist in a
professional service organization, the managers of a professional service or-
ganization in which a member retains traditional professional responsibility
cannot have the continuing exclusive authority to determine all the matters
described in the preceding sentence. Instead, such measure of central control
is no more than that existing in an ordinary large professional partnership
which has one or more so-called managing partners and in which a member
retains the traditional professional autonomy with respect to professional
decisions and the traditional responsibility of a professional person to the
client or patient. Such measure of central control is essentially different from
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classification of professional organizations, 46 the 1965 amendments
seem to conclude, nevertheless, that a professional service organi-
zation cannot be taxed as a corporation, even though a state may
have chartered it as a corporation. Although in most cases, it will
have limited liability, a close reading will reveal that under these
regulations a professional corporation generally does not have the
requisite continuity of life, centralization of management and
transferability of interests. Since it only has one of the four cor-
porate characteristics, it cannot be classified as a corporation for
tax purposes.
the centralization of management existing in an ordinary business corporation.
Therefore, centralization of management does not exist in such a professional
service organization.
(4) A professional service organization has the corporate characteristic
of limited liability within the meaning of paragraph (d) of this section only
if the personal liability of its members, in their capacity as members of the
organization, is no greater in any aspect than that of shareholder-employees
of an ordinary business corporation. If under local law and the rules pertain-
ing to professional practice, a mutual agency relationship, similar to that
existing in an ordinary professional partnership, exists between the members
of a professional service organization, such organization lacks the corporate
characteristic of limited liability.
(5) (i) If the right of a member of a professional service organization
to share in its profits is dependent upon the existence of an employment rela-
tionship between him and the organization, free transferability of interests
within the meaning of paragraph (e) of this section exists only if the member,
without the consent of other members, may transfer both the right to share in
the profits of the organization and the right to an employment relationship
with the organization.
(ii) The corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests exists
in a modified form within the meaning of paragraph (e) (2) of this section
when a shareholder in an ordinary business corporation can transfer his in-
terest in such corporation only after having offered such interest to the other
shareholders at its fair market value. In such a case, the so-called right of first
refusal applies only to an interest which is a right to share in the profits, the
assets, and the management of the enterprise. However, if the interest of a
member of a professional service organization constitutes a right to share
in the profits of the organization which is contingent upon and inseparable
from the member's continuing employment relationship with the organization,
and the transfer of such interest is subject to a right of first refusal, such
interest is subject to a power in the other members of the organization to deter-
mine not only the individuals whom the organization is to employ, but also
who may share with them in the profits of the organization. The possession
by other members of the power to determine, in connection with the tranfser
of such an interest, whom the organization is to employ is so substantial a
hindrance upon the free transferability of interests in the organization that
such power precludes the existence of a modified form of free transferability
of interests. Therefore, if a member of a professional service organization
who possesses such an interest may transfer his interest to a qualified person
who is not a member of the organization only after having first offered his
interest to the other members of the organization at its fair market value, the
corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests does not exist.
46. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 (c), -2(h) (1) (i), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 553.
[VOL. 9
PROFESSIONAL CORPORA TIONS
This was the state of the law when a group of lawyers in Col-
orado incorporated their practices under Rule 265 of the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure.4 7 This action led to open battle with the
47. Colo. R. Civ. P. 265: I.
Professional Service Corporations. Lawyers may form professional service
corporations for the practice of law under the Colorado Corporation Code,
providing that such corporations are organized and operated in accordance
with the provisions of this Rule. The articles of incorporation of such corpora-
tions shall contain provisions complying with the following requirements:
A. The name of the corporation shall contain the words "professional
company" or "professional corporation" or abbreviations thereof. In ad-
dition, the name of the corporation shall always meet the ethical standards
established for the names of law firms by Canon 33 of the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics heretofore adopted by this Court as if all the stockhold-
ers of the corporation were partners.
B. The corporation shall be organized solely for the purpose of con-
ducting the practice of law only through persons qualified to practice law
in the State of Colorado.
C. The corporation may exercise the powers and privileges conferred
upon corporations by the laws of Colorado only in furtherance of and
subject to its corporate purpose.
D. All shareholders of the corporation shall be persons duly licensed
by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to practice law in the State
of Colorado, and who at all times own their shares in their own right.
They shall be individuals who, except for illness, accident, time spent in
the armed services, on vacations, and on leaves of absence not to exceed
one year, are actively engaged in the practice of law in the offices of the
corporation.
E. Provisions shall be made requiring any shareholder who ceases to be
eligible to be a shareholder to dispose of all his shares forthwith either to
the corporation or to any person having the qualifications described in
paragraph D above.
F. The president shall be a shareholder and a director, and to the
extent possible all other directors and officers shall be persons having the
qualifications described in paragraph D above. Lay directors and officers
shall not exercise any authority whatsoever over professional matters.
G. The articles of incorporation shall provide and all shareholders of
the corporation shall agree (a) that all shareholders of the corporation
shall be jointly and severally liable for all acts, errors and omissions of
the employees of the corporation, or (b) that all shareholders of the cor-
poration shall be jointly and severally liable for all acts, errors and omis-
sions of the employees of the corporation except during periods of time
when the corporation shall maintain in good standing lawyers' profes-
sional liability insurance which shall meet the following minimum stan-
dards:
1. The insurance shall insure the corporation against liability im-
posed upon the corporation by law for damages resulting from any
claim made against the corporation arising out of the performance of
professional services for others by attorneys employed by the corpora-
tion in their capacities as lawyers.
2. Such policy shall insure the corporation against liability im-
posed upon it by law for damages arising out of the acts, errors and
omissions of all non-professional employees.
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Internal Revenue Service and resulted in the now famous United
3. The insurance shall be in an amount for each claim of at least
$50,000 multiplied by the number of attorneys employed by the corpo-
ration; the policy may provide for an aggregate top limit of liability
per year for all claims of $150,000 also multiplied by the number of
attorneys employed by the corporation; provided that no firm shall be
required to carry insurance in excess of $300,000 for each claim with
an aggregate top limit of liability for all claims during the year of
$900,000.
4. The policy may provide that it does not apply to:
(a) any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or
omission of the insured corporation or any stockholder
employee thereof;
(b) the conduct of any business enterprise (as distinguished
from the practice of law) in which the insured corporation
under this rule is not permitted to engage but which
nevertheless may be owned by the insured corporation or
in which the insured corporation may be a partner or
which may be controlled, operated or managed by the
insured corporation in its own or in a fiduciary capacity,
including the ownership, maintenance or use of any prop-
erty in connection therewith;
(c) bodily injury to, or sickness, disease or death of any per-
son, or to injury to or destruction of any tangible prop-
erty, including the loss of use thereof.
and may contain reasonable provisions with respect to policy period, ter-
ritory, claims, conditions and other usual matters.
If.
A. A copy certified by the Secretary of State of the articles of incor-
poration of any corporation formed pursuant to this Rule shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Colorado, together with a certified
copy of all amendments thereto. At the time of filing the original articles
with said Clerk, the corporation shall file with said Clerk a written list
of shareholders setting forth the names and addresses of each and a writ-
ten list containing the names and addresses of all persons who are not
shareholders who are employed by the corporation and who are autho-
rized to practice law in Colorado. Within ten days after any change in
such shareholders or employees, a written list setting forth the informa-
tion required by the preceding sentence shall be filed with said Clerk.
B. The corporation shall do nothing which if done by an attorney em-
ployed by it would violate the standards of professional conduct established
for such attorney by this Court. The corporation shall at all times comply
with the standards of professional conduct established by this Court and
the provisions of this Rule. Any violation of this Rule by the corporation
shall be grounds for the Supreme Court to terminate or suspend its right
to practice law.
C. Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to diminish or change the
obligation of each attorney employed by the corporation to conduct his
practice in accordance with the standards of professional conduct promul-
gated by this Court; any attorney who by act or omission causes the corpo-
ration to act or fail to act in a way which violates such standards of pro-
fessional conduct, including any provision of this Rule, shall be deemed
personally responsible for such act or omission and shall be subject to
discipline therefor.
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States v. Empey48 in which both the United States District Court
and the Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the legal corporation
formed under Rule 265 was a corporation for tax purposes. Empey
was followed by eight similar cases, 49 all reaching the same result.
Finally, on August 8, 1969, in Technical Information Release 1019
the Internal Revenue Service announced ". . . that it is conceding
that organizations of doctors, lawyers, and other professional
people organized under state professional association acts will,
generally, be treated as corporations for tax purposes."
In spite of the conciliatory tone of this release, some note should
be made of the different reasoning in the cases that led to the posi-
tion taken by the Internal Revenue Service. The three cases which
went to the courts of appeals-Empey v. United States, O'Neil v.
United States and Kurzner v. United States-illustrate different
approaches to the question. The facts of the three cases are similar
and give rise to the same issue. In each, a group of professionals in-
corporated under a state statute or rule. The shareholders of these
corporations were the professionals who were also employees of
the corporation. The articles or by-laws established a board of
directors which was to manage the corporation and imposed, in
compliance with the applicable local statute or rule, restrictions on
who could own stock. In addition, the state statute or rule granted
to the business continuity of life and provided for the limited
liability of the professional shareholder-employees to the same ex-
tent that the liability of a shareholder-employee of an ordinary
business corporation is limited. Under paragraph (h) of the regu-
lations, the corporations would not be classified as "corporations"
for tax purposes. All three courts held subsection (h) invalid as
unreasonable, discriminatory and legislative in character. The
courts unanimously agreed that the professional corporations were
corporations for tax purposes. On this point, however, their reason-
ing differed.
The O'Neil court and the Empey court, in its principal argument,
held that the Kintner regulations "are entitled to no weight and
are invalid . . ."o to the extent that they are used to determine
D. Nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to modify the attorney-client
privilege specified in C.R.S. 1963, 154-1-7(2) and any comparable com-
mon law privilege.
III.
Except as provided by this Rule, corporations shall not practice law. Pro-
fessional service corporations organized and operated in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule shall not be deemed lay agencies within the meaning
of the Canons of Professional Ethics. (Effective December 5, 1961.)
48. 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969), aff'g 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
49. Cases cited, supra note 3.
50. O'Neil v. United States, 410 F.2d 888, 895 (6th Cir. 1969).
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whether an "incorporated" organization is a corporation for tax
purposes. The courts stated that the Kintner regulations can be
used only to decide whether "unincorporated" organizations can be
classified as "associations" wihin the meaning of Section 7701 (a)
(3). Under this view, therefore, professional groups which receive
a corporate "label" under state law are a fortiori corporations for
tax purposes whether or not they meet the standards of the
Kintner regulations.
The Kurzner court, and the Empey court, in a secondary argu-
ment, however, refused to adopt the state labeling position or to
find the Kintner regulation totally invalid as applied to profes-
sional corporations. After holding subsection (h) invalid, the courts
applied the standards set forth in the Kintner regulations to the
professional corporations involved and found that the organizations
resembled a corporation more than a partnership.
The impact that the differing approaches of these cases has on
professional corporations in New Mexico will be discussed below.
Suffice it to say that under T.I.R. 1019 the difference in approach
appears to be of no practical importance. However, we are left with
the same issue with which the discussion began: what effect should
state law have on the classification of professional organizations
for tax purposes ?51
II
PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZING AND OPERATING
A NEW MEXICO PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
In 1963, the New Mexico Legislature enacted a Professional
Corporation Act,52 which was amended in 1969," s for the purpose
of providing "for the incorporation of an individual or group of
individuals, to render the same professional service to the public for
which such individuals are required by law to be licensed or to
obtain other legal authorization. ' 54 Although the Act itself is com-
posed of only fourteen brief sections, the provisions of the Business
Corporation Act are expressly made applicable to professional cor-
porations except where they conflict with the provisions of the
Business Corporation Act.55
One or more persons licensed to perform the same professional
service may organize a professional corporation by filing articles of
51. See Commissioner v. Bosch 387 U.S. 456 (1967). For a discussion of the Bosch
case as applied to the professional corporation problem, see Note, Taxation of Profes-
sional Corporations, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 328, 336-38 (1968).
52. N.M. Laws 1963, ch. 16.
53. N.M. Laws 1969, ch. 245.
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-22-1 (Supp. 1969).
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-4 (Supp. 1969).
(VOL 9
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
incorporation with the corporation commission.5" The articles must
contain the same information that is found in the articles of any
business corporation as well as certain stock restriction informa-
tion.57 The name of the professional corporation must include the
words, or an abbreviation thereof, "limited," "chartered," "pro-
fessional association" or "professional corporation.
' 5 8
Unlike a conventional corporation, however, a professional
corporation may have only one purpose: It may render only one
specific type of professional service and may not engage in any
other type of business, professional or otherwise. 59 Professional
services include those performed by certified and registered public
accountants, chiropractors, optometrists, dentists, osteopaths, podi-
atrists, architects, veterinarians, doctors of medicine, doctors of
dentistry, physicians and surgeons, attorneys at law and life insur-
ance agents. 0 Despite the prohibition set out above, "a professional
corporation may own real and personal property necessary or
appropriate for rendering the type of proessional service it was
organized to render and may invest its funds in real estate, mort-
gages, stocks, bonds and any other type of investments."6 1
It can be fairly said that the statute's general plan is to have as
shareholders of the corporation only individuals who are also the
professional employees of the corporation. Section 9 of the Act
allows only licensed or authorized members of the particular pro-
fession for which the corporation was organized to be share-
holders. Now Section 7 provides that the professional service can
be rendered only by "officers, employees and agents who are duly
licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render such professional
services." Although the professionals who are not employees of the
corporation are not specifically prohibited from becoming share-
holders, it does not seem likely that one group of professionals
would have as shareholders persons who are members of a com-
peting firm. Besides, professional ethics might forbid it
The Act has its own stock restriction provisions. Section 10 re-
quires that the corporation's articles provide for the purchase or
redemption of the shares upon a shareholder's death or disqualifi-
cation. The purchase or redemption must occur within thirty days
after establishing disqualification or within eight months after the
death of the shareholder. Under Section 11, the stock must be
56. Id.
57. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-22-10 (Supp. 1969).
58. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-22-6 (Supp. 1969).
59. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 51-22-3.B., -5 (Supp. 1969).
60. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-22-3.A. (Supp. 1969).
61. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-2-5 (Supp. 1969).
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purchased or redeemed at its book value determined as of the last
day of the month preceding the death or disqualification of the
shareholder unless the articles or by-laws fix a different price.
Suffice it to say that some provision in the articles or by-laws de-
fining the rights of both the unqualified shareholder and the corpo-
ration or other purchaser is wise. Section 10 is a type of provision
which is the necessary result of attempting to superimpose upon the
corporate structure traditional rules of professional responsibility.
If shares of stock in a professional corporation could pass at death
by will or intestacy, the shares in a professional corporation could
be held by persons not registered to render the same professional
service as that for which the corporation was organized.
Section 12 must be read in connection with the above provisions.
That section provides that a shareholder who "becomes legally dis-
qualified to render the professional service within this state, or is
elected to public office that, pursuant to existing laws, is a restric-
tion or limitation upon rendering of a professional service" must
sever all employment with and financial interest in the corporation.
The obligation is on the corporation to make certain that the dis-
qualified shareholder complies with this rule. Failure to do so could
cause dissolution of the corporation. Together, 10 and 12 provide
that any person who becomes legally disqualified, is elected to public
office or accepts other employment restricting his authority to render
the service under Section 12 is "disqualified" to render the pro-
fessional service within the meaning of section 10. Thus, he must
terminate his employment and his shares must be purchased or re-
deemed within thirty days or the corporation will be dissolved.
Section 10 has a "saving" clause: "Any shares held in violation
of such provisions may be cancelled by action of the board of
directors." Thus, if a shareholder becomes disqualified within the
meaning of section 12, or if he dies, and if his shares are not pur-
chased or redeemed pursuant to section 10, the directors can pre-
vent a dissolution by "cancelling ' 6 2 his shares. However, this pro-
vision raises a question with respect to section 9. That section reads:
"Shares of stock in a professional corporation shall be issued and
transferred only to persons who are duly licensed or legally au-
thorized to render the professional service for which the corpora-
tion is organized." What is the effect of stock issued or transferred
to persons who do not fit this description? There are three possible
answers: (1) the shares are voidable under the section 10 saving
clause; (2) the shares are void; or (3) the transaction, and not the
shares, is void."8
62. Presumably, by "cancelling" the legislation means "voidi.ng."
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The saving clause should not have any effect on Stock issued or
transferred in violation of section 9. The simple reason is that the
saving clause is the final sentence of a paragraph in a section dealing
with an analogous but different problem . 4 Without more, it cannot
be construed to apply to a different section. Moreover, the sentence
is a "saving" clause-a provision to protect the corporation from
dissolution. Section 9 implies something stronger-a rule compar-
able to the language that stock "shall be issued only" to qualified
persons.
In interpreting section 9, stock issued by the corporation must be
distinguished from stock transferred by a qualified shareholder to
a nonqualified person. In the former instance the stock should be
declared void; under section 9, the corporation did not have the
authority to issue stock to that person. However, when a share-
holder transfers the stock to an unqualified person, the transaction
and not the stock, should be declared void. In the first place, the
stock was legally issued by the corporation. Secondly, if the transac-
tion is voided, the problem of whether the shares again become
valid when the transaction is rescinded and the shares are restored
to the transferring stockholder is avoided.
A final stock ownership problem which is not dealt with in the
Act concerns the retirement of a shareholder-employee. Under the
Act, his stock does not have to be redeemed or repurchased. Recall
that the Act does not specifically require a shareholder to be an
employee. However, it would seem that a retiring member should
be bought out the same as a partner. The articles, the by-laws, or a
buy-and-sell agreement should provide for this contingency.
The "operations" provision of the Act also has as its purpose
the maintenance of the traditional professional relationship. Section
63. A fourth possibility is that the shares are voidable by the directors without
employing the saving clause. However, this is not a viable alternatvie. Without some
authority, directors usually cannot void shares that were properly issued.
64. Section 10 provides:
Sale and transfer of shares.-A. The articles of incorporation of any pro-
fessional corporation shall provide for the purchase by the corporation, its
shareholders, or any person duly licensed or authorized to render the service
for which the corporation is organized, of all shares of its stock;
(1) held by any person who shall have become disqualified to render the
professional service for which he was licensed or authorized; or
(2) which devolve by operation of law upon any person or legal entity not
licensed or authorized.
B. Any purchase of shares under paragraph (1) of subsection A shall be
effected within a period of thirty [30] days after establishment of the dis-
qualification. Any purchase of shares under paragraph (2) of subsection A
shall be effected within eight [8] months from the date of devolution. Any
shares held in violation of such provisions may be canceled by action of the
board of directors.
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7 provides that only officers, employees, and agents of the corpora-
tion who are duly licensed or legally authorized to render the par-
ticular professional service may render such service for the corpora-
tion.65 As has been indicated, these employees will usually be share-
holders. The Act, however, does change one aspect of the tradi-
tional professional relationship. It limits a shareholder's liability
for the acts of an "employee" or "agent" to the amount he has
contributed to the corporation.66 Section 8 provides that the Act
"does not modify the legal relationships, including confidential re-
lationships, between a person performing professional services and
the client or patient who receives such services; but the liability of
shareholders shall be otherwise limited as provided in the Business
Corporation Act . . . and as otherwise provided by law." Thus,
although the confidential or other professional relationship between
professional employee and the client or patient is retained, mutual
agency is eliminated. A professional "employee" can be personally
liable for his wrongful acts; he can also make the corporation liable
for his wrongful acts. But the other professional shareholders, who
are also the other professional employees, cannot be held liable. In
a partnership, on the other hand, all members of the firm would be
jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts of one of them.
A final point to be discussed involves the board of directors of a
professional corporation. Like business corporations, a professional
corporation must be managed by a board of directors consisting of
at least three members. A question arises whether these members
must be duly licensed or legally authorized to render the profes-
sional services involved. The Act has no provisions dealing specifi-
cally with directors. The closest provision is section 7 which states
that the corporation can render services only through its "agents"
who are duly licensed or legally authorized. Since the rendering of
services is quite different from the management of the corporation,
this section does not cover directors qua directors.
In the large professional corporation, whether each director must
be a member of the particular profession is probably of little prac-
tical importance since a select group of less than all the members
will compose the board of directors. But consider the one- or two-
man professional firm. If the board must include only like profes-
sionals, compliance with the three-man board rule is impossible
without bringing in professionals who are not rendering services for
this corporation and who are in all likelihood rendering services for
a competing firm. It seems unlikely that a small group of profes-
65. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-22-7 (Supp. 1969).
66. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-22-8 (Supp. 1969).
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sional persons would be anxious to have a member of a competing
group participate in its management. In the case of lawyers, ethical
problems may arise when the small group of lawyers and the law
firm from which the outside director or directors come are repre-
senting competing interests. On the other hand, if the Act means
that non-professionals may serve on the board, a one- or two-man
firm may incorporate by placing laymen on the board of directors.
This interpretation might cause ethical problems: how can a layman
make policy for a medical or a legal corporation? The net effect
may be to exclude from professional corporation status the one- or
two-man firm. Or even if we accept that these other directors are
really "dummies," unless the O'Neil case is followed, the one- or
two-man firm may lack centralized management which is one of the
essential features of a corporation under the Kintner regulations,
and the tax advantages sought by organizing a professional corpora-
tion may be jeopardized.
III
TAX CLASSIFICATION OF PROFESSIONAL GROUPS INCORPORATED
UNDER THE NEW MEXICO PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT
To review what was presented earlier, the government has con-
ceded that a professional corporation can be classified as a corpora-
tion for tax purposes. However, although it seems that the Service
in T.I.R. 1019 has agreed to follow O'Neil and Kurzner on their
facts, has not indicated whether the O'Neil or the Kurzner rationale
would be followed. If O'Neil is followed, then any New Mexico
professional corporation, because it is a corporation under local
law, would be classified as a corporation for tax purposes. But if
Kurzner is applied, organizations formed under the New Mexico
Professional Corporation Act, to be treated as corporations for tax
purposes, may still have to meet some version of the Morrissey
tests for determining "corporateness." It is thus profitable to
analyze the New Mexico statute in terms of the corporate charac-
teristics set down in Morrissey and the 1960 regulations since this
is the direction subsequent legal analysis may take.
.4. Limited Liability
As noted above, the question of the liability of a professional
employee-shareholder for the acts of his fellow employees is clear
under the statute. Under section 8, the liability of a professional is
limited to that of an ordinary corporate employee-shareholder.
Thus sufficient limitation on liability exists for tax purposes.
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B. Centralized Management
Under section 4 of the Professional Corporation Act, the man-
agement of a professional corporation is controlled by the provi-
sions of the Business Corporation Act, which provide that the
business of the corporation should be managed by a board of direc-
tors composed of at least three members.67 The board of directors
composed of fewer than all the professionals employed by the cor-
poration and exercising the usual powers of a board of directors of
a business corporation would satisfy the requirement for centralized
management. The type of centralized management present in an
ordinary business corporation may of course create ethical problems
for a professional since it affects his individual responsibilities to
the client or patient. In Empey the court of appeals specifically
found that the board of directors there had control over the law-
yers' work including the reviewing and modifying of the work
product.6 8 Although under the New Mexico act, the possibility for
centralized management exists, the articles, by-laws, other docu-
ments and the practice of the corporation must assure that the
corporation is managed by the board of directors. A small partner-
ship or a sole practitioner, however, may have difficulty complying
with this centralized management standard.
C. Continuity of Life
Since professional corporations formed under the Professional
Corporation Act are governed in general by the Business Corpora-
tion Act, the death of a professional shareholder-employee would
not cause dissolution of the organization as is the case under the
Uniform Partnership Act. Thus, as far as technical continuity of
life is concerned, a professional corporation would qualify both
under the general test of the Morrissey case and under the more
specific requirements of the 1960 regulations.
D. Transferability of Interests
The Morrissey case and the 1960 regulations require that the
shares of interest in the organization attempting to qualify as a
corporation must be transferable in order to have the corporate
characteristic of free transferability of interests. The question is
to what extent the transferability of shares in a professional cor-
poration can deviate from the corporate norm of the transferability
67. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-24-34 (Supp. 1969).
68. See the district court's opinion in Empey for many of the factors to be con-
sidered in planning a professional corporation.
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of the shares of an ordinary business corporation and still be con-
sidered "freely transferable." In the first place, the shares of a
professional corporation may, under the statute, be transferred only
to a transferee who is also qualified to practice the profession. Thus,
the class of transferors is substantially more limited, by statute,
than in the case of an ordinary business corporation. The district
court in Empey seemed to find the type of restriction as somewhat
in derogation of the usual transferability of corporate shares,
though of course the court did find that the organization qualified
as a corporation.
As to restrictions on transfer by private agreement, to which the
statutory restriction can be compared, the 1960 regulations recog-
nize that a right of first refusal does not in itself eliminate the
corporate characteristic of transferability of interests, it only "mod-
ifies" it.69 Thus, if section 9 is treated like a restriction in a private
agreement, it would seem that this "modified" transferability of
interests exists. However, section 9 may contain a special problem.
If it is interpreted to mean that all "shares" transferred in violation
of the section are null and void, then there exists a substantial
limitation on free transferability of interest which is certainly a
major deviation from the usual situation with respect to shares in
an ordinary business corporation. However, if section 9 is inter-
preted to mean that a transfer in violation of the section is void,
then the deviation is not so substantial. In fact, it would seem that
it would not differ from a transfer in violation of a restriction
agreement, except that one is by statute and may be automatic while
the other is by agreement and may require court enforcement.
In addition, the requirement of section 10 that the articles must
provide for purchase or redemption of shares on the death of a
shareholder is also a restriction on transferability; but, again a
restriction of this type did not bother the courts in the Empey cases.
E. Summary
Although the Act does contain some ambiguities, a tentative ap-
plication of the calculus of corporate characteristics set up in Mor-
rissey and expanded in the 1960 regulations does yield the result
that a professional corporation organized under the New Mexico
Professional Corporation Act can be classified as a corporation for
federal tax purposes. Applying the 1960 regulations, it appears that
such a corporation can have at least three of the four characteristics:
limited liability, centralized management (in corporations with at
69. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960).
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least four members) and continuity of life. Furthermore, we believe
that a corporation organized under the Act also possesses free trans-
ferability of interests as it is understood today. It should be noted
that the mechanical three out of four tests was introduced by the
1960 regulations and had never been expressly accepted by any court.
The Morrissey case itself speaks merely of corporate resemblance.
So far we have been examining the application of the Morrissey
developed tests at the level of theory, asking whether it is in theory
possible for a corporation organized under the New Mexico Profes-
sional Corporation Act to have the features deemed necessary for
corporate characterization. This examination takes as its standard
the normal business corporation as it is structured in the corporate
statute and disregards any deviations from these standards in prac-
tice. It is common knowledge, however, that the four corporate
characteristics so stressed by some of the cases do not in fact exist
in the normal closely-held business corporation. Transferability of
shares is generally restricted by private agreement, centralized man-
agement does not exist in corporations dominated by a single share-
holder, continuity of life may not in practice be present if the cor-
poration depends on one principal officer-shareholder, and liability
may not in fact be limited since personal guarantees may be required
on corporate obligations. If an approach looking to the "realities
of the situation" is taken, it would seem to lead logically to the
conclusion that the granting by the state of the corporate charter is
sufficient to establish "corporateness" for federal income tax pur-
poses. Since no examination is made of whether ordinary business
corporations actually possess the four corporate characteristics,
similarly no examination should be required in situations in which
the professional corporation was actually incorporated, that is,
received its charter, under a statute such as the New Mexico Pro-
fessional Corporation Act. O'Neil takes this approach. T.I.R. 1019,
by accepting the O'Neil decision, also seems to take this approach.
IV
OTHER TAX PROBLEMS
The government's retreat from the battle over the classification
of professional corporations for tax purposes does not mean that
the war has been won. Attacks based upon tax rules and concepts ap-
plicable to corporations in general can still be brought against the
professional corporation. For instance, the corporation could be
disregarded as a "sham;" or deductions, credits or other allow-
ances could be disallowed under section 269 of the Internal Revenue
Code; or the employer-employee relationship between the profes-
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sionals and the corporation required for a qualified plan under sec-
tion 401 could be determined not to exist; or the professional cor-
poration could be treated as a personal holding company with its ad-
verse consequences; or the income earned by the corporation could
be attributed to the professionals under Lucas v. Earl according to
the theory that the professionals and not the corporation actually
earned the income; or the income might be allocated to the profes-
sionals under section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code; or the
salaries paid to the professional employees could be attacked as un-
reasonable. Most, if not all, of these problems can be avoided by
planning at the corporation's inception. The remainder of this article
will discuss problems raised by section 269 and the employer-em-
ployee relationship, and suggest ways to avoid them. Other writers
have dealt with the other topics.70 Since little can be added to what
they have said, it has been decided not to present their points in this
discussion.
.4. Section 269 of the Internal Revenue Code
Section 269 provides that if any person or persons acquire control
of a corporation "and the principal purpose for which such acquisi-
tion was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax by
securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which
such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy," the Com-
missioner can disallow all or any part of such deduction, credit, or
other allowance. 71 "Control" means ownership of stock possessing
at least 50 per cent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock
of the corporation.72 Section 269 applies to the deductions, credit
or allowance enjoyed by either the person acquiring the corporation
or the acquired corporation. 7 An acquired corporation includes a
newly-formed corporation. 4
Without question, a professional group which incorporates ac-
quires control of a corporation within the meaning of section 269.
70. See, e.g., O'Neill, Professional Serv.ice Corporations: Coping with Operational
Problems, 31 J. of Taxation 94 (1969) ; Eaton, Professional Corporations and Associa-
tions in Perspective, 23 Tax L. Rev. 1, 18-27 (1967) ; Snyder & Weckstein, Quasi-Cor-
porations, Quasi-Employees and Quasi-Tax Relief for Professional Persons, 48 Cornell
L. Rev. 613 (1963) ; Anderson, Tax Aspects of Professional Corporations, 1963 So.
Cal. Tax Inst. 309, 326-31; Alexander, Some Tax Problems of a Professional Associa-
tion, 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 212, 214-27 (1962) ; Bittker, Professional Associations and
Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17 Tax L. Rev. 1, 5 n.8
(1961).
71. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 269(a), (b).
72. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 269(a).
73. James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1960), aff'# 176 F.
Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1959).
74. Id.
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But whether section 269 can be used to disallow certain deductions
is not so certain. To put the issue-whether section 269 can be used
to allow certain deductions claimed by a professional corporation-
into perspective, a description of the type of argument the Commis-
sioner could use against professional corporations will be presented.
Then the issue will be discussed.
Assume that five doctors, who had been practicing as a partner-
ship, have incorporated their practice. Assume further that at the
end of the first year, the corporation has net income of $300,000,
before salaries paid to the five doctors and contributions under a
qualified profit-sharing plan for the benefit of the doctors are de-
ducted. The doctors have received a salary of $50,000 each and the
corporation has made contributions under the profit-sharing plan
equal in amount to fifteen per cent of each doctor's salary. 75 Under
this situation, the corporation's taxable income is $12,500 ($300,000
- ($250,000 + $37,500) ; its tax liability is $2,750 ($12,500 X
22%).
In attempting to apply Section 269, the Commissioner's argu-
ment will be that the doctors have secured a benefit they would not
have enjoyed without forming the corporation. Under section 404
of the Internal Revenue Code, the maximum amount that the part-
nership could have deducted for contributions made pursuant to a
qualified profit-sharing plan would have been $12,500 ($2,500 for
each partner X five partners)." As a corporation, however, since
an employer-employee relationship has been established, the max-
imum deduction is fifteen per cent of the salaries paid to the doc-
tors. Thus, by incorporating, the doctors are enjoying as a deduction
$25,000 more than they could have enjoyed as a partnership. The
Commissioner could, therefore, disallow as a deduction against the
75. Assume also that amount contributed to the profit-sharing is deductible under
section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404(a). It is
intended that the amount contributed-15 percent of the doctors' salaries-be the max-
imum amount allowed to he deducted under section 404(a) (3) of the Code.
76. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404-(e) (1).
77. This argument has been developed from Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673
(2d Cir. 1968) which is discussed in detail below. A second argument, based on judge
Kaufman's dissent in Borge, is that in disallowing some of the deduction, account
should be taken of the tax deferral benefits that the doctors are enjoying by incorporat-
ing. As a partnership, only $2,500 for each partner could be contributed to a qualified
profit-sharing plan, which amount is not considered as taxable income. As a corpora-
tion, $7,500 on which the doctors will pay no tax when it is contributed is being contrib-
uted to a qualified profit-sharing plan for each doctor. In other words, by incorporat-
ing, the doctors are enjoying more than just the extra amount the corporation can
deduct. They are also enjoying a reduction in their own tax liability, resulting from
the additional contributions paid under the plan. As Judge Kaufman indicates, if this
approach is followed, then section 269 can be used to reduce a corporate deduction
only in its first taxable years, and not in subsequent years.
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professional corporation's income $25,000 of the contributions
made under the qualified profit-sharing plan. By so doing, the cor-
poration's taxable income would be $37,500 ($300,000 - $250,000
+ $12,500) ; its tax liability would be $11,500 ($25,000 X 22%
+ $12,500 X 48%), an increase of approximately $9,000. Fur-
thermore, a similar amount could be disallowed every year. Note
that this argument is not questioning whether the profit-sharing
plan is qualified under section 401, nor is it an attempt to "disregard
the corporate entity" and treat the medical practice as a partnership.
The Commissioner's argument is analogous to section 1563 of the
Code.77 That section provides that a controlled group of corpora-
tions, as defined in section 1561, can elect around the rule of section
1561, which allows only one surtax exemption for each controlled
group of corporations, if each corporation in the controlled group
pays an additional tax of six per cent on its income up to $25,000.
In the present situation, the Commissioner's argument in effect
would allow a professional corporation to enjoy the benefits of a
qualified profit-sharing plan if the corporation agrees to pay an ad-
ditional tax (the rate depending upon whether the surtax applies)
on an amount equal to the difference between the amount contributed
by the corporation pursuant to the plan, which is usually the max-
imum amount allowed, and the maximum deduction allowed to self-
employed individuals.
It has generally been thought that the Commissioner could not
proceed on this kind of argument and use section 269 to disallow
deductions like the one discussed above. Section 269 was never in-
tended to foil such plans .7  As one writer has said: "Since Con-
gress has seen fit to tax corporations (and associations) differently
from partnerships, should Section 269 be stretched to deny the
choice provided by Congress for bona fide organizations which can
qualify as associations [or corporations] ? The answer should be in
the negative."79 However, this line of reasoning has recently been
rejected by the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second
78. Section 269 has been the source of much controversy. Although it appears to be a
straightforward section, especially when compared with other Code sections, we are
not certain of its full application. For a short but good discussion of the problem.see
Bittker and Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 630-45
(2d ed. 1966).
79. Alexander, supra note 70, at 225. Compare Professor Herwitz's statement con-
cerning the use of section 269 to disallow the surtax exemption:
Quite apart from sematics, there may be reason to doubt that § 269 (a) (1)
was intended to apply to those tax attributes of the acquired corporation which,
like the surtax exemption, result simply from existence as a corporation. Cer-
tainly the primary target of the section was the special tax benefits of the
particular acquired corporation, such as "current, past or prospective losses
or deductions, deficits, or current or unused excess profits credits." See S. Rep.
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Circuit. On December 17, 1968, Borge v. Commissioner ° was de-
cided, which it is believed is very similar, if not "on all fours,"
with the problem under discussion.
In 1952, Victor Borge commenced operations as a sole proprietor-
ship of a poultry farm for the development and sale of rock cornish
hens. For each year from 1954 to 1957, inclusive, the farm suffered
a loss in excess of $50,000. After the first two months of 1958, the
farm was losing $23,133. To avoid the limitations of section 270,
which restricts the amount of losses from a trade or business which
an individual taxpayer can offset against other income to $50,000
a year if the trade or business has losses in excess of $50,000 for five
consecutive years, Borge formed Danica Enterprises, Inc., and trans-
ferred the farm to Danica in return for Danica stock. Then, as the
court of appeals stated:
Since Danica had no means of meeting the expected losses from the
poultry business, Borge and Danica entered into a contract at the
time of the organization of the corporation under which Borge agreed
to perform entertainment and promotional services for the corpora-
tion for a five-year period for compensation from Danica of $50,000
per year. Danica offset the poultry losses against the entertainment
profits, which far exceeded the $50,000 per year it had contracted to
pay Borge ...
Danica did nothing to aid Borge in his entertainment business ...
Danica's entertainment earnings were attributable solely to the serv-
ices of Borge, and Danica's only profits were from the entertainment
business.8'
For the fiscal years ending February 28, 1959 to 1963, inclusive,
No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1943). Confining the section to such items
would be more consonant with the "would not otherwise enjoy" language,
which seems to look to something other than the tax attributes which inhere in
any corporation. More important, failure to so confine the section means that
it could be applied to deny the surtax exemption in a case where only a single
corporation has been created. This possibility can not be dismissed on the
ground that there would always be enough non-tax purposes for a single in-
corporation to preclude the application of § 269. Often the primary purpose for
incorporating a growing enterprise is the desire to be able to accumulate funds
in the business at corporate rather than individual tax rates, and of course
the surtax exemption would be an integral factor in any such planning. Per-
haps the answer to this is that the "would not otherwise enjoy" language would
not be satisfied where the only "benefit" involved is the tax rate applicable to
all corporations. Cf. I.T. 3757, 1945 Cum. Bull. 200, ruling that § 269 does not
apply to the formation of a foreign selling subsidiary to take advantage of the
lower tax rate provided under §§ 921 and 922 for corporations whose income
is derived from Latin America; accord, Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. No.
55 (1966). D. Herwitz, Business Planning 168-69 (1966).
80. 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g, modifying and remanding T.C. Memo.
1967-173.
81. 405 F.2d at 675.
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Danica suffered losses from the operation of the poultry farm of
$309,557, $194,346, $69,473, $29,797 and $57,586, respectively.
Its net entertainment income for the five years before deducting
Borge's salary, resulting from its contract with Borge, was $141,441,
$146,402, $143,826, $283,315 and $117,340, respectively. The
Commissioner's attack was two-pronged. First, under section 482 of
the Code, he allocated and taxed to Borge $75,000, instead of
$50,000 of Danica's entertainment income. Secondly, under section
269, he disallowed a deduction in each of Danica's "first three fiscal
years ended February 28 or 29, 1959, 1960 and 1961 for that por-
tion of its net loss in excess of $50,000 in operating its poultry bus-
iness, and . . . net loss carry-overs from its fiscal years (1) 1959
to 1960 (2) 1959 and 1960 to 1961, and (3) 1959 and 1960 to
1962 . . .,,)2 Both the tax court and the court of appeals, with one
judge dissenting, accepted the Commissioner's determination. Only
the section 269 issue will be explored here.
The rationale on which the Commissioner and the two courts
based their decision is simple. In organizing Danica, Borge acquired
control of a corporation for the principal purpose of avoiding the
loss limitation of section 270. Since he enjoyed a benefit he could
not otherwise have enjoyed, section 269 can be used to restrict the
amount of this benefit. However, the court of appeals did not stop
there. Borge had contended that section 269 could only be used to
disallow losses sustained prior to acquiring control of the corpora-
tion and not losses sustained by the corporation after its acquisi-
tion. 3 As Judge Kaufman said in his dissent:
.. .where, as here, the business is incorporated just before sec-
tion 270 would be called into play for the purpose of avoiding its
application, the proper remedy under section 269 is to disallow the
benefit actually obtained by the enterprise while operated as an in-
dividual proprietorship. And that benefit was the deduction of bus-
iness losses from individual income. Thus, the Commissioner should
have recomputed the loss deductions for the years .. . [the poultry
farm] was unincorporated; the remedy which he chose instead, and
of which the majority approves, bears no necessary correlation to
the deduction benefit which Borge obtained by incorporating .. . in
avoidance of section 270.8
It appears that Judge Kaufman would have disallowed in Danica's
82. T.C. Memo. 1967-173, 26 T.C.M. 816, 817 (1967).
83. Borge relied on Zanesville Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 507 (6th
Cir. 1964) ; and Herculite Protective Fabrics Corp. v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 475 (3d
Cir. 1968) ; but see R. P. Collins & Co., Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir.
1962).
84. 405 F.2d at 680-81.
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first taxable year the loss deduction benefit acquired by incorporating
just before section 270 had come into play (the pre-acquisition bene-
fit) and would not have disallowed any deduction for subsequent
years (post-acquisition benefits)."" In rejecting this argument, the
majority indicated that section 269 applied to all deductions a tax-
payer would not have enjoyed except by incorporation, whether they
be "built-in," "anticipated" or "prospective." The majority recog-
nized that this contradicted the holding in prior cases"6 but decided
that "the better view permits the disallowance of deductions for
post-acquisition losses of an acquired corporation where those deduc-
tions were a part of the purpose for which the corporation was
acquired. 8 7
It would seem that Borge applies directly to our hypothetical
doctor situation."" The amount of deduction benefit that the part-
nership could enjoy for amounts contributed under a profit-sharing
plan was limited to ten per cent of each partner's distributed share
of the partnership income or $2,500 whichever is less. 9 By forming
a corporation and establishing an employer-employee relationship,
the amount that could be deducted from the corporation's income
was fifteen per cent of the doctors' salaries. Thus, there is a benefit
that is being enjoyed that could not otherwise be enjoyed without
incorporating. This benefit is similar to the benefit Victor Borge
enjoyed. In both cases, an attempt was made to avoid limitations on
the amount that could be deducted which does not apply to corpora-
tions.
The previous paragraph assumed one factor: that the principal
purpose for forming the professional corporation was tax avoid-
ance. Section 269 stipulates that its rules will apply only if the prin-
cipal purpose for the incorporation is tax avoidance. If the principal
purpose is other than tax avoidance-a nontax business purpose-
the section does not apply, even if tax avoidance is a subsidiary rea-
son.
In New Mexico and states with similar professional corporation
acts, a professional group has at least two other purposes for in-
corporating, each or both of which might be the principal purpose.
First, the professionals can enjoy limited liability to the same extent
as a shareholder-employee of an ordinary corporation. Second, the
professionals can increase administrative and operational efficiency
85. See note 77, supra.
86. See Note 83, supra.
87. 405 F.2d at 679.
88. It would also seem that Borge applies to any corporation formed primarily to
enjoy the pension or profit-sharing plans of section 401.
89. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404(e) (1).
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since a corporation allows them to centralize management. This
latter purpose can only be persuasive in the incorporation of a
"large" group of professionals."'
The problem does not end here, however. Under present tax
procedure, the burden is on the professionals to prove that their
principal purpose for incorporating their practices was not a tax
avoidance purpose or, to put it in the positive, that their principal
purpose was a nontax business purpose. In other words, they need
evidence to corroborate their testimony that the primary reason for
incorporating was to enjoy the corporate attributes, not the addi-
tional tax benefits. This evidence can be there if the professional cor-
poration has been well planned. For instance, if the articles, by-
laws, the employment contracts and other documents provide ex-
pressly for centralization of management by giving to the board of
directors the authority to determine all policy questions and to su-
pervise the practice-for example, to determine salaries, bonuses,
vacations, hiring and firing policies, work hours and conditions, gen-
eral work assignments and fee ranges-then there is evidence sup-
porting the argument that the principal reason for forming the pro-
fessional corporation was to enjoy centralized management. If the
board does in fact act as a board-and holds regular meetings for
which minutes are kept-then it seems that the credibility of this
evidence cannot be attacked. Furthermore, if limited liability or cen-
tralization of management is the principal purpose for the profes-
sional corporation, then the professionals should testify to this in-
tent immediately by putting it in writing. As Professors Bittker and
Eustice state:
* . . the ultimate issue in every case is the acquiring person's intent
or state of mind with respect to the challenged transaction. This in
turn, places a premium on the development of contemporaneous rec-
ords showing business (as opposed to tax) reasons for a particular
transaction, with the attendant artificialities (and, at times, ethical
problems) which this may entail.91
90. It is interesting to note that the District Court in the O'Neil case found that a
group of doctors incorporated for "the non-tax 'business purpose' of controlling a
sizeable and unwieldy organization . . ." 281 F. Supp. 359, 361 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
91. Bittker and Eustice, supra note 78, at 64-1.
Realistically speaking, the business purpose argument set out above will not
fit one man professional corporations. The corporation cannot have centralized
management and since the sole shareholder will be liable as an employee for
his wrongful acts, it does not have limited liability in the full sense of the
term. The only argument for one man professional corporations is that the
contractual liability of the corporation cannot reach the professional share-
holder personally; this is the principal reason why he incorporated his
practice.
OCTOBER 1969]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
B. Employer-Employee Relationship
Section 401 of the Code requires that an employer-employee re-
lationship exists if the full benefits of a pension or profit-sharing
plan established under that section are to be enjoyed. A corpora-
tion affords professionals the opportunity to create this relationship.
It is axiomatic that partners cannot be employees of their partner-
ships. However, the formation of a corporation does not automat-
ically give rise to this relationship. The professionals can be related
to the corporation as independent contractors. If that be the case,
the benefits of an ordinary pension or profit-sharing arrangement
are lost. The professional independent contractors could only enjoy
the benefits of the Keogh Plan, which is what they were enjoying as
partners.
A review of the regulations, 9 2 cases, 3 revenue rulings94 and arti-
cles 5 indicates that professionals can be employees of a professional
corporation. Writers, with some disagreement,"' have generally
conceded that this causes little trouble conceptually. Instead, the
problem lies in establishing the employer-employee relationship.
When the corporation is formed, steps must be taken to assure that
this relationship is created.
The planning device that is needed to establish the relationship
is the employment contract. Every professional from the senior
member of the firm to the newest associate should enter into an em-
ployment contract with the corporation. 7 These contracts should be
alike, differing only in amount of benefits one professional-employee
will receive as compared with another. After studying the recent
cases98 and revenue rulings, 9 it appears that each agreement should
contain clauses providing for the following:
(1) The amount of compensation that the professional-employee is
to receive and that this compensation is to be received only from
the corporation.
(2) The professional-employee can perform services only for the
92. Treas. Regs. §§ 31, 3121 (d)-1, 31.3401 (c)-l.
93. Flemming v. Huycke, 284 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1960); Vincent M. Ravel, T.C.
Memo. 1967-182; Wendall E. James, 25 T.C. 1296 (1956) df. United States v. Silk,
331 U.S. 704 (1947) ; Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Carey, 103 F. Supp. 7 (N.D.
Ohio 1952).
94. Rev. Rul. 66-274, 1966-2 C.B. 446; Rev. Rul. 65-312, 1965-2 C.B. 394; Rev.
Rul. 61-178, 1961-2 C.B. 153; Rev. Rul. 57-21, 1957-1 C.B. 317; Rev. Rul. 84, 1953-1
C.B. 404.
95. See articles cited in note 70, supra.
96. See Bittker, supra note 70 at 5, no. 8.
97. See the Empey cases, supra note 3.
98. See note 93, supra.
99. See note 94, supra.
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professional corporation. In other words, he cannot be a part-
time employee who has his own or another practice on the side.
(3) Only the professional-employee can perform the services for the
corporation. He cannot substitute another professional in his
place. Along with this, the agreement might provide that only
the corporation can engage and pay for consulting or other
services.
(4) The professional-employee is required to comply with set pol-
icies, rules and regulations as applied to all professionals.
(5) The corporation, or some segment of it, will have general super-
visory authority over the performance of the professional's work.
(6) The privileges enjoyed by the professional employee. These
privileges should be the same, though different in degree, that
the other professional-employees enjoy.
Obviously the business of the corporation must be conducted pur-
suant to these agreements. The professionals must conduct them-
selves as employees and not partners. Furthermore, the corporation
should execute all contracts or other legal documents, bill all clients
and pay all bills. Finally, the corporation must get an employer-
identification number from the Service and regularly must pay all
the necessary employment taxes.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been limited in scope. The objec-
tive has been to expose some of the tax and New Mexico corporate
problems directly involved with the present controversy surround-
ing professional corporations. The discussion has centered on at-
tacks the Internal Revenue Service has brought and could bring
against the professional corporation. The conclusion reached is that
generally professionals can ward off all such attacks.
However, it cannot be concluded from this article or discussion
like it that professionals as a general rule should incorporate. Many
more problems than have been discussed here must be resolved. 00
Tax questions-both corporate and partnership-concerning the
transition from a partnership to a corporation must be answered.
Tax questions concerning the operation of the corporation must be
considered. And tax questions concerning a possible liquidation of
the corporation must be excogitated. In addition to the tax prob-
lems, business and personal factors have to be studied. Probably
the most troublesome question concerns whether the professionals
are willing to operate as a corporation. Are they willing to give up
100. See Snyder & Weckstein, supra note 70, for a discussion of most of the
problems.
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the flexibility that the partnership offers for the more rigid struc-
ture of a corporation? For example, will each individual involved be
willing to accept the role of an "employee" with all its suffocating
restrictions in place of his position as a partner and the freedom it
gives? Before incorporating a group of professionals-his own or
someone else's group-the lawyer must face all the issues and then
resolve that a corporation is the best business organization for that
group. The present fancy for the professional corporation must not
cloud the lawyer's judgment. His decision must still be grounded on
calculated tax, business and non-business advantages to be gained
and disadvantages to be suffered.*
* Following preparation of this article, the Senate Finance Committee voted to
include in its version of the Tax Reform Bill of 1969 legislation restricting the tax
status of professional corporations. Wall Street Journal, October 29, 1969, at 1, Col. 5.
As a result, it would seem that decisions to incorporate professions should be postponed
until action is taken on the bill.
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